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Abstract  We  study  cross-country  GDP  losses  due  to  ﬁnancial  crises  in  terms  of  frequency
(number of  loss  events  per  period)  and  severity  (loss  per  occurrence).  We  perform  the  Loss
Distribution  Approach  (LDA)  to  estimate  a  multi-country  aggregate  GDP  loss  probability  density
function and  the  percentiles  associated  to  extreme  events  due  to  ﬁnancial  crises.  We  ﬁnd  that
output losses  arising  from  ﬁnancial  crises  are  strongly  heterogeneous  and  that  currency  crises
lead to  smaller  output  losses  than  debt  and  banking  crises.  Extreme  global  ﬁnancial  crises
episodes,  occurring  with  a  one  percent  probability  every  ﬁve  years,  lead  to  losses  between
2.95 and  4.54%  of  world  GDP.
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Costes  de  la  producción  real  de  las  crisis  ﬁnancieras:  un  enfoque  de  distribución  de
pérdidas
Resumen  Se  estudian  pérdidas  de  PIB  por  países  originadas  por  crisis  ﬁnancieras  en  términos
de frecuencia  (número  de  eventos  de  pérdida  por  periodo)  y  severidad  (pérdidas  por  ocur-G32 rencia). Se  utiliza  el  enfoque  Loss  Distribution  Approach  (LDA)  para  calcular  la  función  de
e  pérdidaagregada  de  PIB  a  través  de  los  países  de  la  muestra  y  paradensidad de  probabilidad  dPALABRAS  CLAVE
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extraer  los  percentiles  asociados  a  eventos  extremos  ligados  a  crisis  ﬁnancieras.Se  encuentra
que las  pérdidas  de  producción  derivadas  de  las  crisis  ﬁnancieras  son  muy  heterogéneas.  Tam-
bién encontramos  que  las  crisis  de  tipo  de  cambio  generan  menos  pérdidas  de  producción  que
las crisis  de  deuda  soberana  o  las  crisis  bancarias.  Los  periodos  extremos  de  crisis  ﬁnanciera
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global  tienen  lugar  con  una  probabilidad  del  1%  cada  5  an˜os  y  conllevan  pérdidas  de  entre  el
2,95% y  el  4,45%  del  PIB  mundial.
© 2012  Asociación  Cuadernos  de  Economía.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  España,  S.L.  Todos  los  dere-
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. Introduction
inancial  crises  have  played  a  quintessential  role  after  the
ollapse  of  the  Bretton  Woods  system  of  ﬁxed  exchange
ates.  Episodes  like  the  Latin  American  debt  crises  in  the
980s,  the  1987  Black  Monday,  the  1992--1993  ERM  crisis,
he  1994--1995  Tequila  crisis,  the  1997--1998  South  East
sian  meltdown,  the  1998--1999  Brazilian  and  Russian  crisis,
he  2000--2001  Turkish  crisis,  the  2001  Argentine  crisis  and
he  2007--2009  global  ﬁnancial  crisis  all  resemble  disaster
vents,  just  like  hurricanes  or  earthquakes.
Like  catastrophic  events,  ﬁnancial  crises  can  be  charac-
erized  by  frequency  and  severity.  In  fact,  analysis  made  in
he  ﬁnancial  crises  literature  often  refers  to  terms  such  as
requency  and  severity  (see  Bordo  et  al.,  2001).  The  insur-
nce  and  operational  risk  theory  and  practice  offer  toolkits
o  analyze  frequency  and  severity  of  losses  as  well  as  aggre-
ate  losses  due  to  catastrophic  or  operational  risk  events.
iven  that  the  losses  to  country  economies  from  ﬁnancial
rises  (in  terms  of  GDP  drop  or  forgone  GDP)  are  similar
o  catastrophic  losses,  we  can  apply  the  Loss  Distribution
pproach  (LDA)  familiar  in  the  actuarial  literature  to  analyze
requency  and  severity  of  losses  and  thus  study  rare  events
nd  their  probabilities  (see  Panjer,  2006;  Shevchenko,  2011).
o  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  there  is  no  attempt  to  quan-
ify  the  frequency  and  severity  of  ﬁnancial  crises  using  the
DA.
The  advantage  of  the  LDA  is  that  we  can  analyze  fre-
uency  of  events  and  severity  in  a  separate  fashion  and  then
ombine  them  to  obtain  a  global  loss  probability  density
unction.  In  the  study  of  GDP  losses  arising  from  ﬁnancial
risis,  it  is  of  interest  to  study  frequency  and  severity  on
heir  own  as  shown  in  Bordo  et  al.  (2001).
The  LDA  allows  us  to  estimate  a  multi-country  aggregate
DP  loss  distribution  and  thus  estimate  conditional  losses  in
he  event  of  a  ﬁnancial  crisis  occurring  in  the  near  future.  We
an  also  determine  the  probability  of  rare  economic  disas-
ers  as  deﬁned  for  example  in  Barro  (2006).  In  contrast  to
arro  (2006),  however,  we  do  not  make  any  assumptions  on
he  channel  through  which  crises  occur  (e.g.  catastrophic
vents  like  earthquakes  or  regular/cyclical  disaster  events).
In  terms  of  methodology,  we  use  the  ﬁnancial  crises
atabase  of  Laeven  and  Valencia  (2008)  to  date  ﬁnancial
rises  across  170  countries  from  1970  onwards.  The  num-
er  of  such  events  over  a  predetermined  period  is  called
he  frequency  of  events.  We  then  estimate  output  losses  per
nancial  crises  event  with  a  number  of  methods.  Afterwards,
e  aggregate  country  output  losses  across  events  over  the
eriod.  Since  a  particular  crisis  event  can  generate  output
osses  over  various  years,  we  set  the  span  of  analysis  to  be
ve  years.  Finally,  we  compound  frequency  and  severity  to
enerate  a  loss  probability  density  of  aggregate  losses  that
llows  us  to  report  standard  risk  measures.
We  ﬁnd  that  output  losses  after  ﬁnancial  crises  are
trongly  heterogeneous  and  a  large  number  of  countries
p
c
g
cever  recovered  their  pre-crises  growth  rates  or  trends.
lso,  we  show  that  currency  crises  lead  to  smaller  output
osses  than  debt  and  banking  crises,  while  the  largest  losses
re  found  after  debt  crises.  The  presence  of  a  debt  crisis  also
xacerbates  any  of  the  other  two  forms  of  crises,  while  the
resence  of  a  currency  crisis  in  the  wake  of  a  debt  or  bank-
ng  crisis  diminishes  output  losses  through  faster  recovery.
anking  and  debt  crises  alone  are  found  to  be  more  severe
han  twin  crises  consisting  of  banking  and  currency  crises  or
ebt  and  currency  crises.
The  LDA  approach  leads  us  to  conclude  that  mean  world-
ide  costs  of  ﬁnancial  crises  within  periods  of  5  years  are  in
he  range  of  0.52--0.81%  of  2005  world  GDP.  Extreme  crises
pisodes,  occurring  with  a  one  percent  probability,  can  lead
o  losses  between  2.95%  and  4.54%  of  world  GDP.
The  analysis  of  losses  produced  in  the  paper  can  be  a
seful  tool  in  discussions  about  the  existence  of  insurance
gainst  the  risk  of  ﬁnancial  crises  at  the  aggregate  level.  For
xample,  Caballero  (2003)  proposes  such  an  arrangement  for
merging  market  economies.
In  what  follows,  we  will  provide  a  short  literature  review
nd  discuss  the  possibilities  at  hand  to  calculate  output  costs
f  ﬁnancial  crises.  In  Section  3, we  introduce  the  method-
logy  of  crisis  identiﬁcation  and  loss  calculation,  while  the
oss  Distribution  Approach  is  explained  in  Section  4.  Results
re  presented  in  Section  5. Section  6  discusses  a  potential
orm  of  international  insurance  and  Section  7  concludes.
. The costs of ﬁnancial crises
n  order  to  quantify  the  costs  of  ﬁnancial  crises,  we  need
o  deﬁne  a  metric.  Studies  on  this  subject  use  a  varied  set
f  cost  measures.  Costs  have  been  estimated  as  ﬁscal  costs,
osts  to  the  stock  market,  and  output  costs.  Among  stud-
es  analyzing  the  same  kinds  of  losses,  methodologies  also
iffer.  In  addition,  one  of  the  main  obstacles  to  measuring
osses  caused  by  ﬁnancial  crises  is  how  to  identify  losses  only
ue  to  ﬁnancial  crisis  and  not  arising  from  other  contempo-
aneous  factors.
.1.  Fiscal  costs,  costs  to  the  stock  market  and
utput losses
n  an  attempt  to  quantify  the  costs  of  banking  crises  to
he  economy,  Hoggarth  et  al.  (2002)  consider  direct  resolu-
ion  costs  as  well  as  broader  welfare  costs  to  the  economy,
pproximated  by  output  losses.  They  argue  that  resolution
osts  are  a  rather  limited  proxy  for  costs  incurred  through
anking  crises,  as  they  may  reﬂect  a  transfer  of  income  from
axpayers  to  banks  rather  than  costs  imposed  to  the  econ-
my  as  a  whole.  The  authors  reason  that  there  could  be  a
ositive  correlation  between  ﬁscal  costs  and  output  losses  if
rises  are  systemic.  On  the  other  hand,  if  ﬁscal  costs  are  a
ood  proxy  for  effective  crisis  resolution,  higher  spending  on
risis  resolution  should  lead  to  lower  output  losses  during  a
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Hoggarth  et  al.  (2002)  assume  that  output  would  have
grown  at  a  constant  rate  based  on  past  growth  performance
and  extrapolate  linear  three  and  ten-year  trends,  whileReal  output  costs  of  ﬁnancial  crises  
crisis  period.  No  clear  statistical  relationship  between  ﬁscal
costs  and  length  of  crises  is  found,  while  output  losses  and
the  length  of  crises  do  depict  a  clear  positive  correlation.
Frydl  (1999)  presents  a  comparative  analysis  of  prior
banking  crises  studies.  As  one  of  the  reasons  for  the  non-
signiﬁcant  statistical  relation  between  resolution  costs  and
crises  length,  he  claims  that  resolution  costs  usually  measure
ﬁscal  costs  of  banking  crises,  which  are  often  subject  to  var-
ious  errors  and  do  not  incorporate  many  indirect  costs  to  the
government  or  the  economy.  Having  dismissed  ﬁscal  costs  as
a  reliable  indicator  for  crisis  severity,  Boyd  et  al.  (2000)  use
the  discounted  value  of  corporate  returns  to  measure  the
impact  of  crises.  Under  the  condition  that  corporate  pro-
ﬁts  represent  a  relatively  constant  fraction  of  total  output,
a  decline  in  the  real  values  of  stock  prices  at  the  onset  of
a  crisis  in  percentage  terms  is  approximately  equal  to  the
decline  in  the  present  discounted  value  of  total  output.
With  regards  to  the  impact  and  depth  of  currency  crises,
possible  measures  to  be  considered  (in  addition  to  output
losses)  are  the  loss  of  international  reserves  and  the  depre-
ciation  of  the  real  exchange  rate  (Kaminsky  and  Reinhart,
1999).  However,  the  most  popular  method  is  to  proxy  costs
to  the  economy  with  GDP  losses,  given  that  economic  growth
is  a  natural  ﬁnal  performance  indicator.  This  is  the  approach
we  follow  in  this  paper.
We  identify  two  strains  of  literature  approximating  real
GDP  losses  due  to  ﬁnancial  crises.  The  ﬁrst  uses  a  dummy
variable  approach  to  estimate  growth  losses  over  samples
of  countries,  studies  such  as  Demirguc-Kunt  et  al.  (2006),
Gupta  et  al.  (2007),  Hanna  and  Huang  (2002)  and  Barro
(2001)  follow  this  path.  The  second  approach  proxies  wel-
fare  losses  by  comparing  GDP  during  a  crisis  period  with  some
estimate  of  potential  output.  Hoggarth  et  al.  (2002)  is  one
representative  study  of  this  latter  approach.  It  estimates
potential  output  assuming  that  output  would  have  grown  at
the  same  constant  rate  based  on  its  past  performance.  Var-
ious  studies,  such  as  Bordo  et  al.  (2001),  Aziz  et  al.  (2000),
Frydl  (1999),  Boyd  et  al.  (2000,  2005)  and  Cecchetti  et  al.
(2009)  calculate  output  losses  from  banking  crises  in  a sim-
ilar  fashion,  even  though  their  trend  estimates  are  based
on  differing  pre-crises  windows,  methods,  deﬁnitions  about
onsets,  ends  and  durations  of  crisis  episodes.
A  main  criticism  of  the  dummy  variable  approach  is  that  it
can  only  identify  average  magnitudes  of  growth  contractions
associated  with  crises  for  all  countries.  It  therefore  does
not  seem  to  be  well  suited  for  highly  heterogeneous  losses.
Output  costs  calculated  through  cross-section  or  panel  data
regressions  are  usually  found  to  be  lower  than  losses  calcu-
lated  based  on  output  gap  estimations.
In  a  comparative  analysis,  Angkinand  (2008)  suggests
that  the  output  gap  approach  is  more  appropriate  than  the
dummy  variable  approach  in  capturing  the  output  costs  of
crises.  This  is  so  because  the  individual  output  costs  across
crises  vary  substantially.  Our  loss  estimation  methodology
therefore  follows  the  output  gap  approach.
2.2.  Output  gap  calculations2.2.1.  Determining  the  length  of  a  crisis
The  literature  does  not  offer  a  unanimously  agreed  method
to  date  the  beginning  of  ﬁnancial  crises.  Banking  crisis  start c15
ates  are  usually  deﬁned  through  a  mixture  of  quantitative
nd  qualitative  criteria.  Caprio  and  Klingebiel  (1996)  rely
n  the  assessment  of  ﬁnance  professionals.  Including  and
xpanding  on  this  approach,  Demirguc-Kunt  and  Detragiache
1998)  compile  ﬁve  studies  of  banking  crises’  starting  dates.
ther  studies  identifying  banking  crises’  dates  are  Kaminsky
nd  Reinhart  (1999),  and  Lindgren  et  al.  (1996).
The  onset  of  a  currency  crisis  is  generally  deﬁned  as  a
ituation  whereby  a  sufﬁciently  large  depreciation  of  the
omestic  currency  occurs,1 often  accompanied  by  a  loss  in
nternational  reserves,  while  a  debt  crisis  takes  place  in  the
vent  of  a  country  defaulting  or  renegotiating  all  or  parts  of
ts  private  debt.  The  most  recent  ﬁnancial  crises  compila-
ion,  widely  used  in  previous  empirical  studies,  stems  from
aeven  and  Valencia  (2008)  and  comprises  banking,  cur-
ency,  and  debt  crises  over  the  period  1970--2008.
To  date  the  end  of  a  crisis  episode,  one  possibility  is  to
eﬁne  the  end  date  based  on  ‘‘expert’’  opinions  or  on  the
‘consensus’’  view  from  various  studies.  An  alternative  is
o  deﬁne  the  end  of  a  crisis  endogenously  once  a  country
eturns  to  a  certain  pre-crisis  growth  rate  or  recovers  its
otential  output  growth  path.
Studies  determining  the  end  of  a  crisis  based  on  the
ecovery  of  the  average  growth  rate  of  a  pre-crisis  window
re,  among  others,  Bordo  et  al.  (2001)  and  Aziz  et  al.  (2000).
uthors  such  as  Boyd  et  al.  (2005)  argue  that  summing  up
eviations  from  an  estimated  trend  up  to  the  point  at  which
he  observed  growth  rate  returns  to  its  pre-crisis  average
s  problematic  since  output  typically  remains  well  below  its
re-crisis  absolute  output  trend  once  the  growth  rate  has
ecovered.
Cecchetti  et  al.  (2009)  avoid  calculating  a  counterfactual
nd  deﬁne  the  end  of  a  crisis  as  the  point  in  time  when  real
DP  has  reached  its  absolute  pre-crisis  level.  This  method
s  problematic  in  at  least  two  ways.  First,  the  method  does
ot  take  opportunity  costs  of  foregone  output  growth  into
ccount.  Second,  the  method  implies  that  a  crisis  is  only
ounted  as  such  if  output  growth  actually  turns  negative  dur-
ng  the  crisis  year.  It  can  be  argued,  however,  that  a  ﬁnancial
risis  has  negative  effects  without  having  caused  an  actual
ecession,  e.g.  through  a  transitory  or  permanent  slowdown
n  growth.  Moreover,  since  potential  growth  rates  vary  across
ountries,  dating  the  end  of  a recession  by  reaching  its  pre-
risis  level  of  real  GDP  can  lead  to  an  underestimation  of
otal  losses  incurred.
.2.2.  Estimation  of  a  counterfactual
o  be  able  to  measure  output  losses  during  crisis  periods
ccording  to  the  methods  described  above,  it  is  necessary
o  compare  actual  output  with  its  trend  level.  There  are  a
andful  of  approaches  to  estimate  trend  GDP  levels.  They
iffer  mainly  by  the  pre-crisis  time  window  chosen,  which
n  turn  depends  on  the  assumption  about  ﬁnancial  crises
ither  following  economic  booms  or  a slowdown  in  economic
ctivity.1 Sometimes an additional criterion of increased speed of depre-
iation as compared to some prior time window is introduced.
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ordo  et  al.  (2001)  use  ﬁve-year  pre-crisis  trends.  In  a  more
ecent  study,  Boyd  et  al.  (2005)  extrapolate  a  trend  using
oth,  a  country’s  own  growth  rate  and  the  world  growth  rate
nd  apply  break  regressions  to  determine  the  end  of  crises
pisodes.  Instead,  Frydl  (1999)  applies  ten-year  pre-crisis
eriods  and  Boyd  et  al.  (2000)  extrapolate  linear  pre-crisis
rowth  trends.
A large  part  of  the  heterogeneity  in  the  magnitude  of  out-
ut  losses  in  the  study  of  crises  stems  from  the  calculation
f  trend  output.  Studies,  such  as  Kindleberger  (1978),  Borio
t  al.  (1994)  and  Logan  (2001)  ﬁnd  that  banking  crises  follow
conomic  booms.  In  this  case,  a  trend  estimated  over  a  short
eriod  prior  to  a  crisis  would  overestimate  potential  output
nd  lead  to  an  overestimation  of  crisis  length  and  depth.
n  the  other  hand,  studies  such  as  Kaminsky  and  Reinhart
1999)  or  Gorton  (1988)  ﬁnd  that  banking  crises  are  often
receded  by  a  slowdown  of  economic  activity,  in  which  case
osses  would  be  understated.
If one  assumes  that  pre-crisis  growth  deviates  (in  either
irection)  from  the  long-term  potential  output  growth  path,
ne  option  is  to  increase  the  pre-crisis  trend  calculation
eriod  in  order  to  capture  mostly  ‘‘normal’’  years.  An  alter-
ative  is  to  exclude  a  certain  period  prior  to  the  onset  of  a
risis.  Last,  the  Hodrick--Prescot  (HP)  ﬁlter  can  be  applied  to
iminish  the  inﬂuence  of  booms  or  recessions  on  the  poten-
ial  growth  path.  While  Aziz  et  al.  (2000)  base  potential
utput  on  the  average  output  of  the  three  years  prior  to
rises,  Bordo  et  al.  (2001)  use  ﬁve-year  pre-crisis  growth
ates  and  Hoggarth  et  al.  (2002)  calculate  potential  output
rends  based  on  ten-,  three-,  and  one-year  pre-crises  growth
ates;  for  a  comparative  study  see  Angkinand  (2008).
Once  we  establish  the  counterfactual,  we  can  estimate
otal  output  losses  by  adding  up  the  difference  between
ctual  and  potential  output  over  the  duration  of  the  respec-
ive  crisis.
Even  though  the  general  concept  is  agreed  upon  across
he  studies  mentioned  above,  several  methodological  issues
emain  debated.  Identiﬁcation  of  crises  accompanied  by
utput  losses  varies  among  studies.  While  some  authors
nclude  a  crisis  if  output  is  below  its  trend  or  if  output  growth
s  negative  during  the  crisis  year,  other  studies  include  crises
ven  though  output  is  above  its  trend  in  the  crisis  year,  given
hat  output  is  below  trend  in  the  subsequent  year  Angkinand
2008).  Further  issues  arise  in  the  case  of  multiple  crises  per
ountry  within  short  periods  of  time.  In  the  case  that  out-
ut  has  not  yet  recovered  from  one  crisis  at  the  point  of
utbreak  of  a  following  crisis,  some  studies  choose  to  sum
osses  of  subsequent  crises  and  report  a  single  loss,  while
thers  divide  losses  across  crises  or  simply  choose  to  exclude
ountries  with  multiple  crises  during  the  sample  period.
.3.  Identiﬁcation  of  causality
o  assess  the  direction  of  causality  between  economic
rowth  and  banking  crises,  Hoggarth  et  al.  (2002)  compare
 sample  of  29  countries  experiencing  banking  crises  with
eighboring  countries  which  did  not  face  banking  crises  at
he  same  time.  The  hypothesis  is  that  ‘‘the  movement  in
utput  relative  to  trend  during  the  crisis  period  would  have
een,  in  the  absence  of  a  banking  crisis,  the  same  or  similar
o  the  movement  in  the  pairing  country’’(Hoggarth  et  al.,
a
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002).  Their  analysis  hints  at  the  point  that  output  losses
re  in  most  cases  caused  by  banking  crises  and  come  as
nforeseen  events.
Bordo  et  al.  (2001)  ﬁnd,  across  all  countries  and  crisis
eriods  considered,  that  recessions  with  crises  are  more
evere  than  recessions  without  them.  These  results  are  in
ine  with  various  studies  such  as  Frydl  (1999).
. Methodology
.1.  Crisis  identiﬁcation
e  use  the  ﬁnancial  crises  dataset  of  Laeven  and  Valencia
2008). Currency  crises,  banking  crises,  and  debt  crises  are
dentiﬁed  over  the  period  1970--2008.  Laeven  and  Valencia
2008)  identify  banking  crises  on  the  basis  of  a  number  of
uantitative  and  subjective  criteria,  such  as  a  large  num-
er  of  defaults  and  a  high  quantity  of  non-performing  loans.
he  starting  year  of  a  currency  crisis  is  identiﬁed  by  build-
ng  on  an  approach  developed  in  Frankel  and  Rose  (1996).
overeign  debt  crises  are  reported  in  the  case  of  sovereign
efaults  to  private  lending  as  well  as  in  a year  of  debt
escheduling.  The  number  of  currency  crises  peaked  during
he  early  1980s  and  the  early  1990s  with  around  30  currency
rises  per  year,  while  banking  crises  have  in  general  been  less
requent  and  peaked  during  the  early  nineties.  The  num-
er  of  debt  crises  per  year  has  been  decreasing  since  the
id-1980s  and  debt  crises  have  nearly  ceased  to  exist  until
ecently,  see  Bicaba  et  al.  (2011).
We  identify  the  starting  date  of  a ﬁnancial  crisis  as  the
ear  of  outbreak  of  any  one  of  the  three  types  of  crises.
eal  GDP  data  is  taken  from  the  World  Economic  Outlook
atabase  and  spans  the  time  period  from  1960  to  2010.
To  calculate  output  losses  caused  by  crises,  the  ﬁrst  step
s  to  deﬁne  whether  a  crisis  has  an  impact  on  the  economy.
n  the  case  where  output  is  compared  to  a  counterfactual,
e  identify  a  crisis  if  output  in  the  crisis  year  is  below  its
rend  level  (trend  output  estimations  are  discussed  below).
n  an  alternative  calculation  of  crisis  losses,  no  counterfac-
ual  is  established  and  a crisis  accompanied  by  output  losses
s  considered  as  such  if  output  growth  is  negative  during  the
risis  year.
For  countries  with  multiple  crises  during  the  sample
eriod  it  is  possible  that  a  crisis  occurs  before  the  econ-
my  has  recovered  from  a previous  crisis.  In  this  case,  we
ssign  subsequent  losses  to  the  later  crisis  date,  establishing
 new  counterfactual.  This  method  is  problematic,  though
ther  alternatives  suffer  from  larger  errors.  Allocating  out-
ut  losses  from  subsequent  crises  to  the  ﬁrst  crisis  would
argely  overstate  output  losses  in  various  cases.
.2.  Output  losses
e  estimate  three  kinds  of  potential  output  trends  and
ropose  several  cutoff  points  to  determine  the  end  of  a
risis.  In  short,  there  is  no  perfect  method  to  estimate  an
bjective  output  trend.  Every  method  presented  shows  both
dvantages  and  disadvantages  depending  on  the  assump-
ions  about  the  mechanics  of  ﬁnancial  crises.
Following  the  literature,  we  estimate  potential  GDP  after
he  onset  of  a  crisis  in  three  ways.  We  estimate  an  HP  trend,
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In  total,  we  observe  62  debt  crises,  122  banking  crises,
and  196  currency  crises.  As  some  of  these  crises  in  effectReal  output  costs  of  ﬁnancial  crises  
where  potential  output  during  a  crisis  episode  is  based  on
the  average  HP  growth  rate  of  the  ten  and  three  year  pre-
crisis  periods.  In  addition,  we  use  average  growth  rates
from  three-year  and  ten-year  pre-crisis  time  windows.  We
compare  the  losses  against  trend  output  levels  to  absolute
losses  (for  episodes  with  negative  growth)  without  consid-
ering  opportunity  costs.  In  total  we  have  thirteen  possible
ways  to  measure  output  losses  as  well  as  their  severity  and
frequency.
Output  losses  are  calculated  as  the  difference  between
actual  real  GDP  and  its  trend  level.  A  graphical  example  is
given  in  Fig.  A.1,  depicting  output  during  the  Ecuadorian
banking  crisis,  which  shows  that  losses  depend  not  only  on
the  deﬁnition  of  the  counterfactual  but  largely  on  establish-
ing  an  end-point  of  a  crisis.
According  to  the  time  output  needs  to  recover  its  pre-
crisis  level, the  effects  of  the  crisis  lasted  two  years  and
led  to  an  output  loss  of  10%  of  GDP.  If  crisis  length  is  cal-
culated  until  real  GDP  growth  reached  its  pre-crisis  growth
rate,  output  losses  occurred  over  a  period  of  two  and  three
years  and  led  to  output  losses  of  10.1%  and  22.4%  of  GDP,  cal-
culated  against  a  three  and  ten-year  pre-crisis  growth  trend
respectively.
As  shown  in  Figs.  A.1  and  A.2,  this  calculation  most  likely
still  does  not  account  for  the  total  output  loss  caused  by  the
1998  Ecuadorian  banking  crisis.  The  period  of  output  loss
increases  to  six  and  seven  years,  and  output  losses  accu-
mulate  to  38.1%  and  51.4%  of  GDP  respectively  if  losses  are
estimated  until  the  level  of  real  GDP  recovers  its  three  and
ten-year  pre-crisis  trend. As  illustrated  in  Figs.  A.1  and  A.2,
output  losses  seem  to  be  underestimated  if  crisis  recovery  is
deﬁned  as  being  completed  at  the  point  where  the  pre-crisis
growth  rate  or  the  pre-crisis  level  of  real  GDP  is  recovered.
As  mentioned  above,  we  estimate  losses  using  various
trends  and  various  cut-off  points  to  determine  the  end  of
a  crisis.  In  total,  13  loss  estimations  are  presented.
We  distinguish  three  deﬁnitions  of  recovery  from  a  cri-
sis.  According  to  the  ﬁrst  deﬁnition,  a  crisis  ends  once  real
output  has  reached  the  level  of  its  counterfactual.  The
alternative  is  that  recovery  is  completed  once  the  average
pre-crisis  growth  rate  is  resumed.  As  some  countries  never
recover  according  to  these  deﬁnitions,  accumulated  losses
against  the  counterfactuals  based  on  linear  three  and  ten-
year  trends,  based  on  simple  averages  of  pre-crises  growth,
are  considered  over  maximum  periods  of  ﬁve  and  ten  years,
while  the  losses  against  trends  based  on  the  HP  ﬁlter  are
allowed  to  accumulate  over  periods  of  maximum  ten  years.
Note  that  an  alternative  potential  remedy  that  we  do  not
pursue  here  in  cases  where  we  have  an  inﬁnite  sum  of  losses
is  to  perform  present-value  GDP  losses  by  discounting  future
losses  appropriately.  In  the  absence  of  a  counterfactual,  a
crisis  is  supposed  to  be  ended  once  output  reaches  its  abso-
lute  pre-crisis  level  of  real  GDP.
4. The Loss Distribution Approach
The  estimated  output  losses  across  countries  obtained  in
the  previous  section  allow  us  to  study  the  frequency  and
severity  of  losses.  In  the  analysis  of  a  ﬁnancial  crisis  hitting
the  world  economy,  two  usual  questions  appear:  (a)  what  is
the  frequency  of  ﬁnancial  crises?  and  (b)  given  a  ﬁnancial
e
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risis,  how  severe  is  it?  The  frequency  of  ﬁnancial  crises  is
he  number  of  such  events  over  a  speciﬁc  period  of  time.
ince  ﬁnancial  crisis  duration  spans  generally  more  than  a
ear,  we  choose  a  ﬁve-year  reference  period  to  count  ﬁnan-
ial  crises.  The  severity  of  a  ﬁnancial  crisis  is  the  amount  of
utput  loss  incurred  in  each  crisis  episode.
Given  the  frequency  and  severity  of  losses  occurring
ithin  5-year  periods,  we  can  use  the  LDA  common  in  the
nsurance  and  operational  risks  literature.  Chernobai  et  al.
2011)  and  Cruz  (2004)  provide  detailed  descriptions  of  the
orkings  of  the  LDA.  We  estimate  two  possible  parametric
istribution  functions  commonly  used  to  describe  the  fre-
uency  of  events  nt over  a  period  of  time  t.  We  also  estimate
 set  of  six  severity  probability  density  functions2 for  events
t,i.  As  contrast  to  the  standard  one  year  period  used  in  the
nsurance  industry  or  in  operational  risk  capital  calculations,
ur  t  represents  periods  of  5  years.  This  is  because  GDP
osses  due  to  ﬁnancial  crises  consider  losses  over  more  than
ne  year.  The  index  i  tracks  each  event  within  the  period  of
nalysis  t.
During  a  5-year  period,  global  losses  are  given  by  the  sum
f  each  loss  event  i across  countries  in  the  sample.
t =
nt∑
i=1
Zt,i (1)
The  random  variable  nt takes  discrete  values  while  the
ariables  zt,i are  non-negative  (positive  losses),  real  valued
uantities.  The  aggregated  loss  S  depends  on  the  realiza-
ion  of  the  discrete  random  variable  (n)  and  the  continuous
andom  variable  (zi).  Therefore,  the  aggregation  S  is  itself
 random  variable  whose  distribution  has  to  be  determined
y  convolution  methods  (Panjer,  2006;  Shevchenko,  2011).
Speciﬁcally,  the  frequency  of  loss  events  (n)  has  a  prob-
bility  distribution  denoted  by  pn =  Pr(N  =  n)  while  the  loss
everity  z  has  a  density  distribution  and  cumulative  distribu-
ion  functions  denoted  by  fz and  Fz, respectively.  According
o  Panjer  (2006), the  cumulative  density  function  of  S is
eﬁned  as:
F(S)  =  Pr(w  ≤  S)
=
∞∑
n=0
pnPr(w|N  =  n)
=
∞∑
n=0
pnF
n
Z (S)
(2)
here  FnZ (S)  is  the  n-fold  convolution  of  the  cumulative  den-
ity  function  of  S.  A  simple  way  to  estimate  F(s)  is  via  Monte
arlo  simulations.  First  we  draw  n  from  pn and  then  we  draw
 from  fz as  many  times  as  indicated  by  n.  Last,  we  sum  up
he  z  draws.
.  Results2 The set is composed of the gamma, exponential, generalized
xtreme value, generalized pareto, log normal and weibull density
unctions.
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in  our  sample  lead  to  output  losses.  We  cannot  conclude
that  banking  and  currency  crises  are  generally  preceded
by  high  or  low  periods  of  growth  as  we  do  not  observe  a
general  dominance  of  losses  calculated  against  three  year
4 Crises’ percentage losses are calculated as the sum of the dif-
ference between real output observed and potential output after
the onset of a crisis until its end, divided by the real output in the
year of crisis onset. Losses are usually larger if calculated on the8  
orm  twin  crises,  we  examine  a  total  of  340  crises  episodes.
epending  on  the  method  applied,  we  ﬁnd  between  110  and
19  contractionary  crises  episodes.  While  around  210  con-
ractionary  crises  episodes  are  identiﬁed  against  HP  trends,
nly  110  crises  were  accompanied  by  negative  growth  rates
uring  the  crisis  year.
Average  losses  are  higher  compared  to  previous  stud-
es.  This  is  so  because  econometric  studies  usually  estimate
osses  over  a  sample  comprising  recessionary  crises  as  well  as
risis  followed  by  a  rebound  in  GDP,  while  we  only  consider
rises  leading  to  output  losses  (against  a  trend  or  absolute).
rom  a  total  of  196  currency  crises  in  our  sample,  between
0  and  120  crises  (depending  on  the  calculation  method
pplied)  have  led  to  a  loss  of  output  compared  to  some  mea-
ure  of  potential  output,  while  63  crises  were  accompanied
y  negative  output  growth.  This  result  is  in  line  with  previ-
us  studies  such  as  Gupta  et  al.  (2007),  who  ﬁnd  that  about
0  percent  of  currency  crises  lead  to  output  contractions
hile  the  rest  were  accompanied  by  output  expansions.
The  analysis  that  follows  concentrates  on  a  benchmark
oss  classiﬁcation  group  that  relies  on  the  HP  ﬁlter:  losses
ntil  recovering  average  10-year  HP  ﬁltered  GDP  growth
ates  (HP10  perc),  the  level  of  a  10-year  HP  ﬁltered  GDP
rend  (HP10  trend),  3-year  HP  ﬁltered  GDP  growth  rates  (HP3
erc),  and  the  level  of  a  3-year  HP  ﬁltered  GDP  trend  (HP3
rend).
.1.  The  frequency  of  ﬁnancial  crises
n  order  to  carry  out  the  LDA,  we  ﬁrst  estimate  distribu-
ion  functions  for  the  frequency  of  losses  from  ﬁnancial
rises.  We  assume  two  commonly  used  distributions  such  as
he  Poisson  and  the  Negative  Binomial  Distribution.  The  key
arameter  in  the  Poisson  distribution  is    which  is  also  the
ean  and  variance  of  the  number  of  losses.  This  is  the  draw-
ack  of  the  Poisson  ﬁt;  the  data  in  our  benchmark  case  (the
our  HP  trend  counterfactuals)  have  numbers  of  crisis  events
ith  variances  of  about  sixteen  times  the  mean.3 Therefore,
he  two-parameter  Negative  Binomial  distribution  is  a  more
exible  way  to  accommodate  our  data.
In  Fig.  A.3  we  depict  the  estimated  distributions  for  our
enchmark  loss  classiﬁcation.  The  Negative  Binomial  distri-
ution  has  a  lower  mode  but  allows  a  more  extreme  number
f  losses  relative  to  the  Poisson  distribution.  The  probabil-
ty  that  the  data  come  from  the  Negative  Binomial  is  higher
or  all  cases  (the  benchmark  and  all  types  of  loss  classiﬁca-
ions).  In  all  cases,  the  mean  number  of  crises  occurrence
ver  ﬁve-year  periods  ranges  from  20  to  30.
.2.  The  severity  of  ﬁnancial  crises
he  average  accumulated  loss  caused  by  ﬁnancial  crises
aries  from  9%  of  real  GDP  to  15%  of  real  GDP  if  output
osses  are  accumulated  against  trends  based  on  HP  ﬁltered
ata  (Table  1).  In  total,  depending  on  the  loss  measure
pplied,  186  to  219  crises  episodes  are  observed.  Average
3 The number of crisis events for the other loss classiﬁcations have
 variance to mean ratio of more than 13, except for the case where
pportunity costs are not considered (ABS).
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osses  are  the  largest  when  calculated  against  a ten-year
rend  and  if  losses  are  considered  until  the  level  of  trend
utput  has  been  recovered  over  a  maximum  time  span  of  10
ears  (Tables  2--6).
Median  losses  lie  between  4.9%  and  7.15%  of  initial  GDP
nd  the  most  severe  crises  destroy  up  to  three  years  of  eco-
omic  output.4 This  result  is  in  line  with  studies  estimating
utput  losses  through  alternative  approaches,  such  as  Cerra
nd  Saxena  (2008).
As  can  be  seen  in  Table  7  through  14  in  Appendix  B,  alter-
ative  estimates  of  output  losses  are  very  heterogeneous.
arge  average  percentage  losses  are  driven  by  few  espe-
ially  severe  crises  events.  Of  these  most  severe  events,
otential  output  has  not  been  reached  again  within  a  period
f  ten  years.  This  result  is  in  line  with  Furceri  and  Zdzienicka
2011), who  ﬁnd  that  the  growth  rate  after  debt  crises  eight
ears  after  the  onset  is  still  suppressed  be  nearly  10  percent-
ge  points.  Amongst  the  largest  losses  observed  are  those  of
everal  Asian  countries,  namely  Indonesia  in  1998  and  Thai-
and  in  1997,  both  experiencing  severe  losses  in  the  wake  of
he  Asian  crisis.
Severity  data  due  to  ﬁnancial  crisis  have  a  key  feature,
t  is  extreme  valued.  In  Fig.  A.4  we  see  that  the  mean-
xcess-over-threshold  plots5 have  positive  slope  at  the  right
xtreme  of  losses.  Fig.  A.4  shows  that  the  long-tailed  nature
f  severity  data  is  generated  by  speciﬁc  types  of  crises.  Cur-
ency  and  twin  currency-banking  crises  produce  the  more
xtreme  type  of  losses  (Tables  15--19).
We  ﬁt  the  severity  data  with  six  possible  probability
ensity  functions  using  the  maximum  likelihood  estimator
or  the  corresponding  parameters.  The  six  distributions  are
amma,  Exponential,  Generalized  Extreme  Value  (GEV),
eneralized  Pareto,  Log-normal,  and  Weibull.  Some  distri-
utions,  like  the  GEV,  ﬁt  the  right  end  tail  better,  while
thers  have  a  better  ﬁt  over  the  entire  range  of  data.
ur  benchmark  choice  is  the  Weibull  distribution  because
t  maintains  a  better  ﬁt  over  the  entire  range  of  data  for  all
everity  classiﬁcations.
.2.1.  Types  of  ﬁnancial  crises
onsistent  with  studies  like  Reinhart  and  Rogoff  (2009), we
nd  that  currency  crises  lead  to  smaller  output  losses  than
ebt  and  banking  crises.6 About  70  of  the  122  banking  crisesasis of other trend estimations as presented in the appendix.
5 The sample mean excess plot is deﬁned by:
n
i
(X1 − u) I(Xi>u)/
∑n
i
I(Xi>u), with u>0 and I(.) and indicator
unction.
6 Distributions of these three types of crises’ losses, calculated
s losses accrued over a maximum period of ﬁve years until the
verage growth rate of a 10-year pre-crises period is recovered, are
epicted in Fig. A.5, while descriptive statistics of all calculation
ethods are provided in Tables 8--14.
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Table  1  Severity  of  ﬁnancial  crises  (as  percentage  of  initial  GDP).
Loss  measure  Obs.  Mean  Median  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max
HP10  perc  204  0.14  0.06  0.24  0.00  2.30
HP10 trend  214  0.15  0.07  0.25  0.00  2.30
HP3 perc  203  0.09  0.05  0.17  0.00  2.04
HP3 trend  219  0.10  0.06  0.12  0.00  1.06
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Note: Estimation of losses to recover average 10 year HP ﬁltered GDP growth rates (HP10 perc), to recover the level of a 10-year HP
ﬁltered GDP trend (HP10 trend), to recover 3-year HP ﬁltered GDP growth rates (HP3 perc), and to recover the level of a 3-year HP
ﬁltered GDP trend (HP3 trend).
Table  2  Severity  of  crises  by  regions----all  crises  (Losses  as  percentage  of  initial  GDP).
Loss  measure  Nr.  Africa  Nr.  Europe  Nr.  Latin  America  Nr.  Asia  Nr.  North.  America
HP10  perc  79  0.13  22  0.17  39  0.10  39  0.20  1  0.01
HP10 trend  85  0.13  24  0.18  40  0.12  40  0.22  1  0.01
HP3 perc  78  0.07  24  0.10  41  0.12  36  0.10  1  0.01
HP3 trend  86  0.08  24  0.14  45  0.08  39  0.12  1  0.01
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Note: Estimation of losses to recover a 10-year HP ﬁltered GDP growth (HP10 perc), to recover the level of the 10-year HP ﬁltered GDP
(HP10 trend), to recover a 3-year HP ﬁltered GDP growth (HP3 perc) and to recover the level of the 3-year HP ﬁltered GDP (HP3 trend).
Table  3  Severity  by  income  groups  (as  percentage  of  initial  GDP).
Loss  measure Nr.  High  income  Nr.  Middle  income  Nr.  Low  income
HP10  perc  21  0.13  122  0.18  61  0.11
HP10 trend  22  0.16  128  0.17  64  0.12
HP3 perc  22  0.07  120  0.11  61  0.07
HP3 trend  23  0.09  128  0.11  68  0.07
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Note: Estimation of losses to recover a 10-year HP ﬁltered GDP growth (HP10 perc), to recover the level of the 10-year HP ﬁltered GDP
(HP10 trend), to recover a 3-year HP ﬁltered GDP growth (HP3 perc) and to recover the level of the 3-year HP ﬁltered GDP (HP3 trend).
Table  4  Severity  over  time----all  crises  (as  percentage  of  initial  GDP).
Period  HP10  perc  HP10trend  HP3  perc  HP3  trend
1970--75  0.02  0.05  0.02  0.06
1975--80 0.11  0.14  0.19  0.09
1980--85 0.18  0.14  0.09  0.10
1985--90 0.12  0.10  0.06  0.07
1990--95 0.15  0.16  0.09  0.12
1995--00 0.19  0.20  0.06  0.07
2000--05 0.11  0.12  0.07  0.07
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
owth
rc) an
s
b
lNote: Estimation of losses to recover a 10-year HP ﬁltered GDP gr
(HP10 trend), to recover a 3-year HP ﬁltered GDP growth (HP3 pe
pre-crisis  trends  as  opposed  to  losses  against  ten-year  pre-
crisis  trends.
We  ﬁnd  that  average  output  losses  after  debt  crises7 are
9%  higher  than  losses  after  banking  crises.  The  median  debt
crisis  is  accompanied  by  output  losses  of  11.7%,  three  per-
centage  points  larger  than  the  median  banking  crisis.  A  large
7 23% of initial GDP if recovery of the average HP growth rate ten
years before a crisis is considered (HP10 perc).
h
a
c
1 (HP10 perc), to recover the level of the 10-year HP ﬁltered GDP
d to recover the level of the 3-year HP ﬁltered GDP (HP3 trend).
hare  of  debt  crises  has,  however,  been  accompanied  by
anking  crises.  Of  the  62  debt  crises  in  our  sample,  36  have
ed  to  periods  of  negative  growth.  Of  these  36  episodes,  26
ave  been  accompanied  by  banking  crises  with  mean  losses
bout  30%  higher  than  if  debt  crises  occur  alone.  Currency
rises8 incur  smaller  losses  than  banking  or  debt  crises  of
5%  in  the  mean  and  5%  in  the  median.  This  result  is  in
8 According to HP10 perc.
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Table  5  Features  of  the  PDF  of  total  losses.
HP10  perc  HP10  trend  HP3  perc  HP3  trend
99.9%  perctl 3.00E+12 3.60E+12 2.40E+12  2.70E+12
99% perctl  1.70E+12  2.00E+12  1.30E+12  1.50E+12
Median 1.90E+11  2.20E+11  1.40E+11  1.60E+11
Mean 3.00E+11  3.60E+11  2.30E+11  2.70E+11
Std deviation  3.70E+11  4.40E+11  2.90E+11  3.30E+11
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Note: (1) Number of simulations equal to 500 000. In all cases, the frequency distribution is the Negative Binomial, the severity PDF is a
Weibull. (2) Losses are measured in constant 2005 USD and correspond to ﬁve-year periods.
Table  6  LDA,  Losses  in  constant  2005  USD,  over  periods  of  ﬁve  years,  as  percentage  of  2005  World  GDP.
HP10  perc  HP10  trend  HP3  perc  HP3  trend
99.9%  perctl  6.81%  8.18%  5.45%  6.13%
99% perctl  3.86%  4.54%  2.95%  3.40%
Median 0.43%  0.50%  0.31%  0.36%
Mean 0.68%  0.81%  0.52%  0.61%
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Note: (1) Number of simulations equal to 500 000. In all cases, the frequency distribution is the Negative Binomial, the severity pdf is a
Weibull, 2005 World GDP from WDI2006.
Table  7  Losses  after  ﬁnancial  crises  (as  percentage  of  initial  GDP).
Loss  measure Obs.  Mean  Median  Std.  Dev. Min  Max
AG(10)(5)perc  186  0.32  0.16  0.44  0.001  2.73
AG(10)(5)trend  186  0.43  0.24  0.52  0.001  3.62
AG(3)(5)perc  182  0.32  0.17  0.40  0.000  2.06
AG(3)(5)trend  186  0.46  0.28  0.57  0.000  4.48
ABS 110  0.85  0.11  2.21  0.000  16.04
AG(10)(10)perc  186  0.54  0.16  1.17  0.001  8.27
AG(10)(10)trend  186  1.06  0.26  1.93  0.001  11.13
AG(3)(10)perc  180  0.58  0.17  1.27  0.000  9.20
AG(3)(10)trend  181  0.99  0.34  1.61  0.000  9.20
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Table  8  Losses  after  currency  crises  (as  percentage  of  initial  GDP).
Loss  measure  Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max
AG(10)(5)perc  101  0.28  0.39  0.001  1.845
AG(10)(5)trend  101  0.37  0.49  0.001  2.213
AG(3)(5)perc  94  0.29  0.37  0.000  1.709
AG(3)(5)trend  94  0.39  0.43  0.000  1.760
HP(10)perc 118  0.14  0.28  0.000  2.299
HP(10)trend 122  0.16  0.29  0.000  2.299
HP(3)perc 114  0.09  0.21  0.001  2.037
HP(3)trend 125  0.09  0.13  0.001  1.063
ABS 61  0.68  1.47  0.000  7.066
AG(10)(10)perc  101  0.37  0.77  0.001  6.26
AG(10)(10)trend  101  0.86  1.82  0.001  11.13
AG(3)(10)perc  94  0.36  0.70  0.000  5.46
AG(3)(10)trend  94  0.85  1.43  0.000  8.34Source:  Authors’ calculations.
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Table  9  Losses  after  banking  crises  (as  percentage  of  initial  GDP).
Loss  measure  Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max
AG(10)(5)perc  69  0.37  0.46  0.003  2.731
AG(10)(5)trend  69  0.48  0.57  0.003  3.616
AG(3)(5)perc  71  0.33  0.39  0.005  2.062
AG(3)(5)trend  71  0.48  0.65  0.005  4.484
HP(10)perc 66  0.14  0.19  0.001  1.277
HP(10)trend  71  0.15  0.21  0.001  1.308
HP(3)perc 70  0.08 0.08 0.000  0.471
HP(3)trend  74  0.10 0.11 0.000 0.757
ABS 35  0.76 2.16 0.000 12.594
AG(10)(10)perc  69  0.76  1.57  0.003  8.27
AG(10)(10)trend  69  1.52  2.47  0.003  11.13
AG(3)(10)perc  69  0.79  1.72  0.005  9.20
AG(3)(10)trend  70  1.71  4.78  0.005  9.20
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Table  10  Losses  after  debt  crises  (as  percentage  of  initial  GDP).
Loss  measure  Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max
AG(10)(5)perc  39  0.50 0.48 0.001 1.695
AG(10)(5)trend  39  0.62 0.48 0.001  1.695
AG(3)(5)perc  39  0.43  0.40  0.001  1.802
AG(3)(5)trend  39  0.52  0.45  0.001  1.802
HP(10)perc 46  0.17  0.14  0.021  0.553
HP(10)trend  47  0.20  0.16  0.006  0.710
HP(3)perc 43  0.12  0.11  0.009  0.485
HP(3)trend  45  0.14  0.11  0.003  0.485
ABS 36  0.87  2.73  0.003  16.038
AG(10)(10)perc  39  1.66  0.82  0.001  4.039
AG(10)(10)trend  39  1.82  2.86  0.001  11.134
AG(3)(10)perc  39  0.63  0.95  0.001  4.605
AG(3)(10)trend  39  1.13  1.49  0.001  5.708
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Table  11  Losses  after  twin  crises----currency  and  debt  (as  percentage  of  initial  GDP.
Loss  measure  Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max
AG(10)(5)perc  56  0.40  0.42  0.001  1.845
AG(10)(5)trend  56  0.53  0.51  0.001  2.213
AG(3)(5)perc  52  0.38  0.42  0.001  1.802
AG(3)(5)trend  52  0.52  0.48  0.001  1.802
HP(10)perc 64  0.13  0.12  0.002  0.517
HP(10)trend  67  0.16  0.15  0.002  0.710
HP(3)perc 66  0.12  0.25  0.002  2.037
HP(3)trend  71  0.10  0.10  0.002  0.485
ABS 42  0.54  1.25  0.003  7.066
AG(10)(10)perc  56  0.57  0.97  0.001  6.26
AG(10)(10)trend  56  1.40  2.55  0.001  11.13
AG(3)(10)perc  52  0.53  0.94  0.001  5.46
AG(3)(10)trend  52  1.08  1.35  0.001  4.75
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
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Table  12  Losses  after  twin  crises----currency  and  banking  (as  percentage  of  initial  GDP.
Loss  measure  Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max
AG(10)(5)perc  78  0.27  0.37  0.001  1.695
AG(10)(5)trend  78  0.34  0.44  0.001  1.695
AG(3)(5)perc  73  0.30  0.34  0.001  1.802
AG(3)(5)trend  73  0.39  0.39  0.001  1.802
HP(10)perc 101  0.15  0.30  0.002  2.299
HP(10)trend 103  0.17  0.31  0.002  2.299
HP(3)perc 95  0.08 0.11 0.001  0.854
HP(3)trend 103  0.10 0.13 0.001 1.063
ABS 56  0.65 1.33 0.000 6.826
AG(10)(10)perc  78  0.31  0.45  0.001  2.19
AG(10)(10)trend  78  0.87  2.11  0.001  11.13
AG(3)(10)perc  73  0.35  0.54  0.001  3.71
AG(3)(10)trend  73  0.72  1.13  0.001  5.71
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Table  13  Losses  after  twin  crises----debt  and  banking  (as  percentage  of  initial  GDP.
Loss  measure  Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max
AG(10)(5)perc  36  0.52 0.50 0.001 1.69
AG(10)(5)trend  36  0.66 0.50 0.001  1.69
AG(3)(5)perc  35  0.42  0.39  0.001  1.80
AG(3)(5)trend  35  0.56  0.41  0.001  1.80
HP(10)perc 32  0.24  0.24  0.009  1.28
HP(10)trend  34  0.26  0.26  0.006  1.31
HP(3)perc 32  0.15  0.13  0.000  0.48
HP(3)trend 33  0.18  0.16  0.000  0.76
ABS 26  1.18  3.17  0.006  16.04
AG(10)(10)perc  36  0.80  1.16  0.001  5.47
AG(10)(10)trend  36  1.76  2.64  0.001  11.13
AG(3)(10)perc  34  0.82  1.70  0.001  9.20
AG(3)(10)trend  35  1.33  1.96  0.001  9.20
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Table  14  Losses  after  all  twin  crises  (as  percentage  of  initial  GDP).
Loss  measure  Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max
AG(10)(5)perc  114  0.32  0.41  0.001  1.84
AG(10)(5)trend  114  0.42  0.49  0.001  2.21
AG(3)(5)perc  105  0.33  0.38  0.001  1.80
AG(3)(5)trend  105  0.45  0.44  0.001  1.80
HP(10)perc 130  0.16  0.29  0.002  2.30
HP(10)trend  136  0.18  0.30  0.002  2.30
HP(3)perc 126  0.11  0.21  0.000  2.04
HP(3)trend 136  0.11  0.14  0.000  1.06
ABS 78  0.90  2.23  0.000  16.04
AG(10)(10)perc  114  0.47  0.95  0.001  6.26
AG(10)(10)trend  114  0.99  2.00  0.001  11.13
AG(3)(10)perc  104  0.53  1.19  0.001  9.20
AG(3)(10)trend  105  0.98  1.54  0.001  9.20
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
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Table  15  Severity  of  crises  by  regions----all  crises  (losses  as  percentage  of  initial  GDP).
Variable  Nr.  Africa  Nr.  Europe  Nr.  Latin  A.  Nr.  Asia  Nr.  North  A.
AG(10)(5)perc  71  0.25  21  0.47  37  0.28  32  0.51  1  0.01
AG(10)(5)trend  71  0.33  21  0.60  37  0.39  32  0.58  1  0.01
AG(3)(5)perc  62  0.23  26  0.41  35  0.31  32  0.51  1  0.04
AG(3)(5)trend  62  0.31  26  0.53  35  0.42  32  0.69  1  0.04
ABS 43  0.78  17  1.23  21  0.31  14  1.41  0  0.00
AG(10)(10)perc  71  0.43  21  0.54  37  0.31  32  1.06  1  0.01
AG(10)(10)trend  71  0.92 21  1.06  37  0.76  32  1.84  1  0.01
AG(3)(10)perc  60  0.34 26  0.58 35  0.38  32  1.16  1  0.04
AG(3)(10)trend  61  0.64 26  1.27 35  0.65 32  1.61  1  0.04
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Table  16  Average  severity  of  crises  by  income  groups  (percentage  of  initial  GDP).
Variable  Nr.  High  income  Nr.  Middle  income  Nr.  Low  income
AG(10)(5)perc  21  0.28  112  0.38  53  0.22
AG(10)(5)trend  21  0.39  112  0.49  53  0.29
AG(3)(5)perc  21  0.24  113  0.38  48  0.23
AG(3)(5)trend  21  0.49  113  0.49  48  0.29
ABS 10  0.44  71  0.79  29  1.13
AG(10)(10)perc  21  0.40  112  0.67  53  0.34
AG(10)(10)trend  21  1.07  112  1.19  53  0.77
AG(3)(10)perc  21  0.43 112  0.68  47  0.41
AG(3)(10)trend  21  1.10  113  1.07  47  0.75
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Table  17  Average  features  of  the  PDF  of  total  losses  (more  cases).
ABS  AG10.10  perc  AG10.10  trend  AG3.10  perc  AG3.10  trend
99.9  percentile  5.70E+12  1.80E+13  3.70E+13  2.20E+13  4.70E+13
99 percentile  2.70E+12  8.70E+12  1.70E+13  1.10E+13  2.20E+13
Median 1.80E+11  6.40E+11  1.20E+12  8.10E+11  1.60E+12
Mean 3.80E+11  1.30E+12  2.40E+12  1.60E+12  3.10E+12
Std. deviation  6.00E+11  1.90E+12  3.80E+12  2.30E+12  4.80E+12
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Note: (1) Number of simulations equal to 500 000. In all cases, the frequency distribution is the Negative Binomial, the severity pdf is a
Weibull. (2) Losses are measured in constant 2005 USD and correspond to ﬁve-year periods.
Table  18  Average  features  of  the  PDF  of  total  losses  (more  cases).
Variable  AG10.5  perc  AG10.5  trend  AG3.5  perc  AG3.5  trend
99.9  percentile  8.80E+12  1.20E+13  1.10E+13  1.50E+13
99 percentile  4.50E+12  6.20E+12  5.40E+12  7.80E+12
Median 4.00E+11  5.40E+11  4.90E+11  6.90E+11
Mean 7.30E+11  9.80E+11  8.60E+11  1.20E+12
Std. deviation  9.80E+11  1.30E+12  1.20E+12  1.70E+12
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Note: (1) Number of simulations equal to 500 000. In all cases, the frequency distribution is the Negative Binomial, the severity pdf is a
Weibull. (2) Losses are measured in constant 2005 USD and correspond to ﬁve-year periods.
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Table  19  USA  2007  banking  crisis  losses  (percentage  of
2007 real  GDP).
Loss  measure  in  billion  USD  %  of  2007  GDP
HP(10)(10)perc  3009.28  22.78
HP(10)(10)trend  14027.90  106.22
HP(3)(10)perc  2014.14  15.25
HP(3)(10)trend  7415.09  56.14
HP(3)(5)  trend 4043.20  30.61
HP(3)(5)  perc 2014.14  15.25
HP(10)(5)trend  6329.73  47.92
HP(10)(5)perc  3009.28  22.78
AG(10)(5)perc  5923.15  44.85
AG(10)(5)trend  5923.15  44.85
AG(3)perc  5552.58  42.04
AG(3)trend  5552.58  42.04
AG(10)(10)perc  15334.18  116.11
AG(10)(10)trend  17874.42  135.34
AG(3)(10)perc  9700.10  73.45
AG(3)(10)trend  17851.69  135.17
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Source:  Authors’ calculations.
ine  with  Furceri  and  Zdzienicka  (2011)  who  concluded  that
ebt  crises  tend  to  be  more  detrimental  than  banking  and
urrency  crises.
Banking  and  debt  crises  alone  are  more  severe  than  twin
rises  consisting  of  banking  and  currency  crises  or  debt  and
urrency  crises.  While  twin  crises  between  banking  or  debt
nd  currency  crises  mostly  lead  to  larger  growth  reductions
n  the  very  short  run  than  banking  or  debt  crises  alone,  long
erm  losses  are  often  found  to  be  smaller.  A  possible  expla-
ation  could  be  that  depreciation  in  the  wake  of  a  twin
risis  (including  a  currency  crisis)  allows  for  a  competitive-
ess  gain  which  is  not  present  when  a  banking  crisis  occurs
lone  and  allows  for  a  faster  recovery.  Twin  crises  consisting
f  debt  and  banking  crises  consequently  incur  the  highest
osses  in  our  sample.9
.2.2.  Severity  by  region
he  highest  losses  after  ﬁnancial  crises  are  experienced  in
sia  with  average  losses  ranging  from  9.8%  to  21.8%  of  initial
DP.10 The  second  highest  losses  are  observed  in  Europe,
ollowed  by  Latin  America  and  Africa.  The  highest  frequency
f  ﬁnancial  crises  is,  however,  observed  in  Africa.  Europe
nd  Asia  are  mostly  struck  by  currency  and  banking  crises,
hile  Africa  and  Latin  America  have  suffered  from  all  three
ypes  of  crises  to  nearly  equal  degrees.  In  a  joint  analysis,
ebt  crises  were  observed  to  be  more  severe  than  currency
r  banking  crises.  This  result  holds  for  all  regions  except  for
sia,  where  banking  crises  lead  to  the  most  severe  losses.
ince  a  high  share  of  currency  and  banking  crises  reported
re  in  effect  twin  crises,  it  is  however  difﬁcult  to  disentangle
osses  from  both  types  separately.  Furceri  and  Zdzienicka
9 For detailed descriptive statistics of other loss measures, please
ee Tables 8--14.
10 Calculated against counterfactuals based on average HP ﬁltered
rowth rates.
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2011)  conﬁrm  our  results  by  controlling  for  other  types  of
rises.
.2.3.  Severity  by  income  groups
n  order  to  compare  losses  across  different  income  groups,
e  classify  countries  into  low,  middle,  and  high  income
ategories.11 On  average,  middle  income  countries  experi-
nce  the  highest  output  losses  (15%),  followed  by  high  and
ow  income  countries  (12%  and  11%  of  initial  GDP  respec-
ively,  see  Table  3).  This  observation  holds  for  currency  and
anking  crises,  while  losses  from  debt  crises  are  almost
xclusively  observed  in  low  and  middle  income  countries.
The  median  crisis  is  more  severe  in  high  income  than  mid-
le  income  countries.  High  average  losses  in  middle  income
ountries  are  driven  by  some  extreme  crisis  events,  such  as
hailand  in  1998,  experiencing  losses  of  229%.12 The  median
oss  is  9%  for  high  income  countries,  7%  for  middle  income
ountries,  and  4%  for  low  income  countries.  In  total,  mid-
le  income  countries  suffer  more  from  ﬁnancial  crises  than
igh  income  countries  as  they  experience  a  larger  number
f  crises  per  country  over  the  period  observed.
.2.4.  Severity  of  ﬁnancial  crises  over  time
s  expected,  ﬁnancial  crises  were  especially  harmful  during
he  1990s  and  depict  the  lowest  losses  during  the  1970s  and
he  period  after  the  year  2000.  However,  this  does  not  nec-
ssarily  mean  that  ﬁnancial  crises  have  become  smaller  in
agnitude.
.2.5.  The  severity  of  the  2007  ﬁnancial  crisis  in  the
SA
ur  main  analysis  considers  a  sample  ending  in  2005.  How-
ver,  we  have  enough  information  to  estimate  the  severity
f  the  2007  ﬁnancial  crisis  in  the  USA.  We  date  the  US  bank-
ng  crisis  to  late  2007  even  though  the  main  event,  Lehman
rothers  ﬁling  for  Chapter  11  bankruptcy  protection,  did  not
ake  place  until  September  2008.  Output  trends  are  calcu-
ated  as  before  with  2007  being  the  ﬁrst  year  of  output  gap
alculations.  Data  are  taken  from  the  IMF  World  Economic
utlook  database  until  2011.  From  2012  until  2016,  real  GDP
orecasts  reported  in  the  IMF  database  are  used.  Reliable
utput  losses  can  therefore  only  be  calculated  over  an  inter-
al  of  5  years  (2007--2011),  larger  loss  windows  are  however
eported  for  comparative  reasons.
Fig.  A.5  in  Appendix  A  shows  real  GDP  for  the  USA  from
995  until  2016.  Average  real  GDP  growth  in  the  ten  years
rior  the  ﬁnancial  crisis  was  3.2  percent  and  3.1  percent  in
he  last  three  years  before  2007.  Real  GDP  growth  slowed
own  to  less  than  2  percent  in  2007  and  ﬁnally  turned  neg-
tive  during  2008  and  2009.
If  the  costs  from  the  ﬁnancial  crisis  are  to  be  considered
ntil  the  pre-crisis  level  of  real  GDP  has  been  reached  again
nd  opportunity  costs  are  ignored,  the  endpoint  of  the  crisis
s  found  to  be  in  2011  and  costs  remain  modest  at  5%  of  2007
eal  GDP.Turning  toward  our  baseline  calculations,  calculated
gainst  a  linear  trend  based  on  a  pre-crisis  time  window  of
 HP  ﬁltered  real  GDP  series,  costs  become  larger  and  range
11 World Bank classiﬁcation.
12 See Fig. A.2 in Appendix A.
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between  15%  and  48%  of  initial  GDP  if  a  5-year  time  is  con-
sidered  and  between  15%  and  107%  if  costs  are  allowed  to
accumulate  for  up  to  ten  years.  The  windows  vary  from  a
three-year  period,  if  the  crisis  is  considered  to  be  overcome
once  the  pre-crisis  average  growth  rate  is  recovered,  to  ten
years  in  the  case  of  deﬁning  the  end  of  a  crisis  as  recovery
of  the  pre-crisis  growth  trend.
Baseline  results  over  5  year  windows  of  around  30%  of
GDP  are  consistent  with  costs  calculated  in  e.g.  Chinn  and
Frieden  (2011),  who  estimate  costs  of  the  2011  ﬁnancial  cri-
sis  at  3.5  trillion  USD,  which  is  roughly  26%  of  2007  real  GDP.
Historically,  the  2007  ﬁnancial  crisis  ranks  among  the
most  severe  crises  episodes.  A  comparable  percentage  loss
of  real  GDP  during  the  last  40  years  has  only  been  experi-
enced  by  some  Asian  countries  in  the  wake  of  the  1998  Asian
crisis.
5.3.  The  distribution  of  total  losses
Given  our  choice  of  the  frequency  distribution  and  the  sever-
ity  probability  density  function,  we  perform  Monte  Carlo
simulations  to  obtain  a  numerical  probability  density  func-
tion  (PDF)  of  total  losses  over  ﬁve  years.  These  PDFs  are
markedly  skewed  to  the  right.  Table  5  summarizes  the
results.  The  99.9  percentile  of  the  total  loss  distribution
ranges  from  2.4  to  3.6  trillion  of  2005  USD.  Estimates  of
cumulative  world  GDP  loss  due  to  the  2008--2009  world  ﬁnan-
cial  crisis  are  5  trillion  (IMF,  2009).  This  means  that  the
recent  ﬁnancial  crisis  losses  occur  with  very  low  probability.
For  the  USA,  Chinn  and  Frieden  (2011)  estimate  a  cumulative
GDP  loss  for  the  USA  to  be  about  3.5  trillion  in  2005  USD.
6. Risk-sharing against ﬁnancial crises
Can  output  losses  from  ﬁnancial  crises  be  diminished  or
crises  prevented  ex  ante  through  an  insurance  scheme
against  rollover  risk  or  capital  ﬂight?  As  ﬁnancial  crises  are
relatively  rare  events,  one  could  imagine  countries  paying  a
certain  amount  of  premium  during  ﬁnancially  stable  times
and  in  return  having  access  to  these  funds  during  times  of
need.
Papers  like  Caballero  (2003)  and  Cordella  and  Yeyati
(2005,  2006)  have  proposed  insurance  schemes  with  global
scope.  The  estimation  of  the  stochastic  properties  of  ﬁnan-
cial  crisis  losses  at  the  global  perspective  in  terms  of
frequency,  severity  and  their  global  aggregation  is  a  useful
device  in  thinking  about  the  proposed  insurance  schemes.
According  to  our  estimates,  the  potential  worldwide  costs
from  ﬁnancial  crises  over  periods  of  5  years  in  percentage
terms  of  2005  world  GDP  are  presented  in  Table  6.  Average
costs  of  ﬁnancial  crises  during  a  period  a  ﬁve  years  are  rel-
atively  small  and  amount  to  less  than  one  percent  of  2005
world  GDP.  A  period  of  extreme  crisis  events,  occurring  with
a  one  percent  probability,  produces  output  costs  of  up  to
4.54%  of  World  GDP.  For  example,  if  there  is  a  will  to  cover
global  losses  up  to  the  99  percentile,  the  amount  of  insur-
ance  coverage  is  such  percentile  minus  the  median  value.Many  of  the  debt  crises  included  in  the  above  calculations
are  in  fact  destabilizing  conﬁdence  crises  or  liquidity  crises,
during  which  rollover  costs  of  debt  become  excessively  high,
rendering  an  illiquid  country  insolvent.  In  a  similar  manner,
l
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iquidity  risk  is  often  the  cause  for  the  occurrence  of  banking
rises.  The  IMF  provides  a  de  facto  insurance  (see  Cordella
nd  Yeyati,  2006) for  these  cases  in  the  form  of  standard
MF  programs.  While  the  IMF  does  play  the  role  of  lender  of
ast  resort,  it  does  so  ex-post,  after  the  country  usually  has
lready  entered  into  ﬁnancial  turmoil.
As  a  type  of  national  insurance  against  crises,  nearly  all
merging  economies  have  accumulated  large  amounts  of
nternational  reserves  in  order  to  possess  a  buffer  against
ro-cyclical  international  capital  ﬂows.  Caballero  (2003)
rgues  that  hedging  the  ﬁnancial  mechanism  behind  macro-
conomic  disasters  is  a  problem  of  a  magnitude  larger  than
 single  market  can  handle.
The  moral  hazard  problem  arising  through  a  potential
nsurance  scheme  is  addressed  in  various  studies.  Cordella
nd  Yeyati  (2005)  examine  to  what  degree  the  presence  of  a
ountry  insurance  scheme  affects  the  policymakers’  incen-
ives  to  undertake  reforms.  An  important  channel  through
hich  insurance  can  foster  reforms  can  be  identiﬁed:
nsurance  reduces  the  probability  that  deteriorating  funda-
entals  evolve  into  large  crises,  which  may  enhance  the
xpected  political  reforms  and  increase  reform  incentives.
Participation  in  a  potential  crisis  insurance  fund  would
herefore  have  to  be  subject  to  ex  ante  compliance  with  a
umber  of  clearly  deﬁned  eligibility  criteria,  such  as  low
udget  deﬁcits  and  a  clear  debt  to  GDP  threshold.  The
otential  insurance  coverage  must  be  forfeited  as  soon  as
he  country  does  not  fulﬁl  all  criteria.  As  stated  in  Cordella
nd  Yeyati  (2006), it  would  also  be  crucial  to  characterize
nd  standardize  the  procedures  followed  after  funds  from
he  insurance  facility  have  been  accessed.  In  the  optimal
ase,  the  existence  of  this  insurance  would  incite  ﬁscal  dis-
ipline  and,  at  the  same  time,  provide  liquidity  if  needed
hich  in  turn  would  lead  to  fewer  crises.
Attractiveness  of  interest  rate  insurance  implies  that  the
nsurance  premium  in  tranquil  times  is  lower  than  the  costs
hrough  high  rollover  costs  in  turbulent  times.  In  addition,
he  countries  not  experiencing  liquidity  problems  have  to  be
ssured  a  beneﬁt  from  the  other  country  not  entering  into
 crisis  which  exceeds  the  costs  incurred  through  the  insur-
nce  premium.  Contrary  to  regular  insurance,  risk  sharing
epends  on  the  contagion  effects  of  ﬁnancial  crises  from
he  country  in  ﬁnancial  turmoil  to  the  liquid  countries.  Fea-
ibility  and  beneﬁt  analysis  is  a  potentially  attractive  area
or  future  research.
.  Conclusion
hrough  the  use  of  the  ﬁnancial  crises  database  of  Laeven
nd  Valencia  (2008)  to  date  ﬁnancial  crises,  we  characterize
he  heterogeneity  of  aggregate  output  losses.  In  our  LDA
etup,  the  number  of  crisis  events  over  a certain  period  is
alled  the  frequency  of  events,  while  the  different  metrics
f  GDP  losses  describe  the  severity  of  such  losses.  We  ﬁt
ommon  parametric  frequency  and  severity  distributions  to
ompound  global  GDP  loss  densities  and  to  report  standard
isk  measures.In  line  with  the  existing  literature,  we  ﬁnd  that  output
osses  after  ﬁnancial  crises  are  strongly  heterogeneous  and
 large  number  of  countries  never  recover  their  pre-crises
rowth  rates  or  trends.  Loss  distributions  are  skewed  to  the
2 D.  Kapp,  M.  Vega
r
i
a
d
a
o
d
a
c
c
r
A
w
c
h
c
c
o
b
w
i
e
l
p
s
b
d
a
l
L
i
i
I
a
o
o
L
c
s
G
A
W
F
A
t
X
A
U
M
B
v
A
F
0
Currency crises
Banking crises
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Debt crises
.2
.4
.6
.8
Figure  A.1  Percentage  loss  distributions.  Currency,  debt  and
banking  crises.
Source:  Authors’  calculations.
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Figure  A.2  Percentage  loss  distributions  over  income
groups.
Source:  Authors’  calculations.
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ight,  with  average  losses  ranging  between  9%  and  15%  of
nitial  GDP.
Currency  crises  lead  to  smaller  output  losses  than  debt
nd  banking  crises,  while  the  largest  losses  are  found  after
ebt  crises.  The  presence  of  a  debt  crisis  also  exacerbates
ny  of  the  other  two  forms  of  crises,  while  the  presence
f  a  currency  crisis  in  the  wake  of  a  debt  or  banking  crisis
iminishes  output  losses  through  faster  recovery.  Banking
nd  debt  crises  alone  are  found  to  be  more  severe  than  twin
rises  consisting  of  banking  and  currency  crises  or  debt  and
urrency  crises.
We  compare  output  costs  from  ﬁnancial  crises  over  world
egions,  country-income  groups,  and  time.  We  ﬁnd  that
sia  has  suffered  from  the  most  severe  ﬁnancial  crises,
hile  Africa  experiences  the  highest  frequency  of  ﬁnancial
rises.  Congruently,  middle  income  countries  experience  the
ighest  output  losses,  followed  by  high  and  low  income
ountries.  Financial  crises  are  observed  to  have  been  espe-
ially  harmful  during  the  1990s,  while  a  global  assessment
f  the  severity  of  the  recent  2008  ﬁnancial  crisis  cannot  yet
e  undertaken  with  our  approach.
The  LDA  approach  leads  us  to  conclude  that  mean  world-
ide  costs  of  ﬁnancial  crises  within  periods  of  5  years  are
n  the  range  of  0.5--0.7%  of  2005  world  GDP.  Extreme  crises
pisodes,  occurring  with  a  probability  of  one  percent,  can
ead  to  losses  in  the  range  of  2.95--4.54%  of  world  GDP.
There  are  some  aspects  that  go  beyond  the  scope  of  this
aper.  For  example,  the  treatment  of  the  appropriate  time
pan  for  the  LDA  planning.  We  consider  a  ﬁve-year  horizon
ut  this  is  not  necessarily  the  best  from  an  optimal  insurance
esign  perspective.  Also,  all  the  calculations  are  based  on
ggregating  GDP  levels  in  comparable  Dollar  units.  All  calcu-
ations  regarding  percentage  GDP  losses  are  made  after  the
DA  aggregation  and  relative  to  an  initial  GDP  level.  There
s  a  possibility  of  exploring  the  LDA  benchmark  by  allow-
ng  for  the  aggregation  of  percentage  GDP  losses  directly.
n  this  case,  suitable  GDP  weights  have  to  be  considered.  In
ddition,  ﬁnancial  crisis  distort  long  run  growth  in  a  number
f  cases,  if  so,  losses  in  terms  of  GDP  per  capita  instead
f  GDP  levels  can  provide  an  adequate  long  run  picture.
ast,  our  loss  approach  is  unconditional  but  the  framework
an  be  extended  to  incorporate  conditioning  factors  in  the
tochastic  processes  that  drive  frequency  and  severity  of
DP  losses.  We  leave  these  issues  open  for  future  research.
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Figure  A.3  Percentage  loss  distributions  over  regions.
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Figure  A.5  Impact  of  the  2007  ﬁnancial  crisis  on  US  growth.
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